

Why There Is No Rational Capitalism in Ukraine: Second Thoughts

Kutuev, Pavlo

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Kutuev, P. (2000). Why There Is No Rational Capitalism in Ukraine: Second Thoughts. In O. Ivashchenko (Ed.), *Ukrainian Sociological Review 1998-1999* (pp. 5-30). Kiev: Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-93691>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

Terms of use:

This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public.

By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use.

PAVLO KUTUEV,

Candidate of Sciences in Sociology, Senior Lecturer in Sociology and Political Science, National University «Kyiv-Mohyla Academy»

Why There Is No Rational Capitalism in Ukraine: Second Thoughts*

It ought to be considered that there is nothing more difficult to plan, more unlikely to succeed with, or more dangerous to manage than to take the lead in introducing new methods of *government*, because the introducer has as enemies all those who profit from the old method, and as only lukewarm defenders all those who will profit from the new ones. This lukewarmness results partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws on their side, partly from the incredibility of men, who do not really trust a new program unless they learn by experience that it is firmly established.

Niccolo Machiavelli

Philosophers conceive of the passions which harass us as vices into which men fall by their own fault, and, therefore, generally deride bewail, or blame them, or execrate them, if they wish to seem unusually pious. And so they think they are doing something wonderful, and reaching the pinnacle of learning, when they are clever enough to bestow manifold praise on such human nature, as is nowhere to be found, and to make verbal attacks on that which, in fact, exists. For they conceive of men, not as they are, but as they themselves would like them to be. Whence it has come to pass that, instead of *ethics*, they have generally written *satire*, and that they have never conceived a

* This article has been substantially rewritten and revised for this volume. Original Ukrainian version appeared in journal «*Sociologija: teorija, metody, marketyng*», 1999, N° 2, pp. 5-21 as «Rational Capitalism in Ukraine: Between Myth and Reality». Translated from Ukrainian by Pavlo Kutuev. The title of this article has been inspired by Sombart' treatise «Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?» [see: 1] and Fukuyama's recent revision of his original «end of history» thesis [see: 2]. Comments are welcome at pkutuev@iatp.kiev.ua.

theory of politics, which could be turned to use but such as might be taken for *chimera*, or might have been formed in *Utopia*, or in that golden age of the poets when, to be sure, there was least need of it.

Benedict de Spinoza

The matters, which other nations turned into habit, into instinct, must be hammered into our heads.

Piotr Tchaadaev

Which figures in the entire picture of modern capitalism might be understood without reference to 'inner-worldly asceticism'?

Max Weber

Introduction

Endless mantras of Ukrainian policy-makers about democratization and radical systemic market reforms have not been able to cover up the grim reality of the politics of shock therapy which has become a permanent shock without therapy. Domestic defenders of vulgar liberal paradigm tend to ignore that Adam Smith authored not only principles of the *laissez-faire* in his monumental «Wealth of Nations» but was concerned with «Theories of Moral Sentiments» as well. Thus, their expectations of swift recapitulation of the economic, social, political, and last but not least cultural institutions developed in the West in the course of centuries under completely different conditions in post-Leninist context appear to be more unrealistic than ever. Naive enthusiasm over self-organizing, progressive and universal force of market has been challenged by the steady pattern of economic decline which finds few parallel in recent history — Ukraine is producing now less than one third of its GDP of 1990, while more than 60% of all economic transactions take place within the frame of reference of black market [see: 3].

American economists Gaddy and Ickes have suggested the general model of Russian alleged «transition to the market» which bears significant relevance to Ukraine's economy. Authors defy the common perception of countries like Russia or Ukraine as largely privatized economies «whose early success in market reform has been slowed by widespread corruption, crime, and incompetence» [4]. They view the main trend in economic development not as a slow progress towards market but as a movement away from it. An emerging new economic system is dubbed a

‘Virtual Economy’, «because it is based on illusion, or pretense, about almost every important parameter of the economy: prices, sales, wages, taxes, and budgets» [4]. The roots of the Virtual Economy lie in the over-industrialization of the previous period. Leninist economies growth was achieved through mass increase of input, while efficiency criteria were neglected. The type of action dominating the Virtual Economy is completely alien to the rational calculation of profit and idea of cost-benefits analysis. Virtual Economy operates under the set of completely different rules, «in fact, manufacturing destroys value, but this is masked by arbitrary pricing» [4]. In Virtual Economy manufactures consume more labor and raw materials than the cost of their output, transforming supposedly value adding sector into value destroying. The reality is covert with manufactures’ claims that output does have an added value, though in fact it does not. Surprisingly all other economic agents accept the rules of the game and agree with the prices which distort the reality and generate unrealistic budgets, wage areas, tax evasion, and impose severe cash constraints on economy as a whole. Moreover, such forms of economic conduct force the economic transaction into semi-legal or illegal realm of black market with a wide use of barter. It is obvious that Virtual Economy exists with a consent of the government and population, for it maintains the social safety net in a society where institutions of social protection designed by the old regime have been destroyed, and new ones have not yet been developed. Virtual Economy can be viewed as a very important cause of relative social stability — it provides participants with an opportunity to pursue their interests within the framework of a *real* shadow economy. To sum up, the rush-to economic modernization of the Soviet era has been superseded by the politics of economic decline based on neotraditionalist moral economy, confirming, that the rhetoric of market reform in Ukraine remains what it is — just a rhetoric with no connection to reality.

Post-Leninist Ukraine: transition to market democracy or society’s failure?

Given such background of a failing society sketched above, the most immediate task for academic commentators — both Ukrainian and Western — is to embark on a generalized debate which might be instrumental for understanding the sources of Ukraine’s current catastrophic situation and developing policy alternatives to deal with its causes and

implications. In other words it is legitimate to reformulate the question with which Werner Sombart was concerned almost a century ago — «Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?» [see: 1] in the following terms — «Why Is There No Rational Capitalism in the Post-Leninist Ukraine?».

The strongest argument employed by transitologists — who often imply unquestionable validity of the background assumptions of neo-liberal market consensus for post-Leninist conditions — to explain the causes of ‘arrested development’ of Western type market economy institutions in Ukraine, is that the government hampers the implementation of the market reforms because of its incompetence and clumsiness coupled with vested interests in an old state run system. However, the debate centers almost exclusively around the problems related to radical transformations in economy and political system, while ignoring the effect of the values of socio-cultural milieu and norms embedded in societal community upon the social development, especially in periods of fundamental structural transformations and breaks/breakdowns of the normative order.

I am developing my argument in the vein of Bryan Turner’s line of reasoning [see: 9] who set out to defend the validity of Weber’s ideas for contemporary social and intellectual concerns. My purpose is, firstly, to defend centrality of Weberian approach to the methodology of social sciences in a context of its applicability to the case of post-Leninist social transformation and, secondly, examine Weber’s vision of the rational capitalism developmental history and prospects for the emergence of such a type of social organization in Ukraine.

At the same time I do share Cornelius Castoriadis’ view that «we cannot, we should not seek — and this again is flipped upside down, diverted, turned into an instrument of mystification and an excuse for irresponsibility in the hands of today’s impostors — a ‘scientific’ theory or even a total theory in the area of society, and still less in any other domain. We cannot for a single instant let ourselves believe that the articles of a political program contain the secret for the future liberty of humanity. We do not have any Good News to proselytize concerning the Promised Land glimmering in the horizon, any Book to recommend whose reading would exempt one from having to seek the truth for oneself. Everything we have to say would be inaudible if it is not understood from the outset as a call for critique that is not from scepticism, for an opening that does not dissolve into eclecticism, for a lucidity that does not halt activity, for the activity that does not become inverted into mere activism,

for a recognition of others that remains capable of vigilance. The truth with which we are henceforth concerned is neither a possession nor the return of the Spirit to itself. It is the movement of people through a free space within which there are few cardinal points» [10, p. 35].

From this critical perspective we can conceive transitiologists' desperate search for civil society, liberal orientations, democratic institutions, constituency for reform as a Western scholarly community of experts on Leninist/post-Leninist societies strive to make its subject-matter legitimate and intelligible through the application of common political science vocabulary and thus underline validity of their scientific claims in the eyes of those scholars who deal with more recognizable realities of liberal regimes [see: 8]. Very few Western and Ukrainian analysts questioned themselves if methodical acquisition of goods can evolve overnight as a style of life in the countries with 70 years of Leninist tradition, for «the Leninist authoritarian habits of mind had been deeply internalized. They generated forms of conduct, attitudes, inhibitions, and a general culture of suspicion, enmity, and shame that cannot be so swiftly overcome by uplifting appeals to the virtues of civil society» [11, p. 691]. In contemporary Ukraine the universal solidarity, sphere of fellow-feeling or *Gesellschaft* as a *Gemeinschaft* as necessary prerequisite of civil society is substituted by «ghetto» political culture when any political involvement and participation in public affairs means 'trouble' [12, p. 288] and Hobbesian principle of force and fraud. They remain to be dominant type of Ukrainian society discourse. This emphasis on the civil society in a discussion devoted to the problems of rational capitalism is not accidental. As it has been shown by insightful student of post-Leninist societies David Stark, one of the necessary preconditions of the dynamic economic development and growth is the interaction and interpenetration of civil society as a locus of values of organic solidarity and cooperation with economic society. For example, the efficiency of Italian small manufactures — one of the key components of Italian post-war economic success — lay in their readiness to pursue common strategy and interpenetration of different spheres of action, since they were «often tied to each other through old trade-union connections, reinforced by political parties, and supported by local governments» [13, p. 83]. Leninist regimes succeeded not only in suppressing market but «also virtually eliminated any institutions of civil society that might form the basis for extensive cooperation in the near future» [13, p. 83].

Max Weber and methodology of comparative-historical social science

Developing policy instruments for tackling societal problems requires analytical probing into them and, therefore, elaboration of adequate theoretical tool boxes. The borrowing of concepts and terms of Western tradition often prove to be useless in different cultural milieu, for as it was noted by brilliant then Soviet philosopher Merab Mamardashvili, «the same words signify no objects in our environment: these objects do not exist at all or they are illusory... The term could be the same but, if we do not reconstruct the concrete reality of the object to which we will apply the term, we will be able to understand nothing. We will never achieve the understanding of Soviet reality through direct transposition and immediate application of extended European terminology» [14, p. 110]. The translation of these meta-theoretical claims into the conceptual vocabulary of comparative social science provides us with the following account of the dynamics and functions of seemingly Western institutions in a different society: «The Japanese have laws, legislators, a parliament, political parties, labor unions, a prime minister, interest groups and stock holders. But one should not be misled by these familiar labels into hasty conclusions as to how power is exercised in Japan. The Japanese prime minister is not expected to show much leadership; labor unions organize strikes to be held during lunch breaks; legislature does not in fact legislate; stock holders never demand dividends; consumer interest groups advocate protectionism; laws are enforced only if they do not conflict too much with the interests of the powerful...» [15, p. 25].

Therefore, it is more productive to employ the ideas of the founders of Western social theory not as a container of ready-made solutions and a tool box for an anatomical dissection of the society and the penetration into the essence of societal development, but as a starting point to construct theoretical frame of reference adequate to the case of Ukraine. In this essay I am seeking to deconstruct the concepts and definitions which often impose a social, political, economic, and epistemic stability that does not adequately reflect the various and ambiguous practices of social life. The debate will focus upon conceptual deliberation as well as analysis of practices and traditions that mold societal outcomes. My hypothesis is that there are different types of capitalism (e.g., rational and political versions of it can be cited as one example of possible typology), and this economic form does not always and necessarily have an elective affinity with such traits we usually associate with Western liberal capitalist civilization as prosperity, equity, and democracy.

Among central classical Western social thinkers my attention was drawn to Max Weber, who elaborated a comprehensive research program of a social science as objective and value free enterprise at presuppositional level, and realized it in his comparative-historical sociological and political studies of fate of Western rational capitalism, economic ethics of world religions, types of legitimate domination and problems arising from everyday workings of modern democratic mass politics. Weber, whose intellectual development was influenced by neo-Kantian tradition (as well as Dilthey's philosophy), went beyond the essentialist bias of Marxist and Hegelian paradigms with their shared belief in the possibility of grasping history's general formula of development, which, in turn, could help to analyze specific social and cultural phenomena. As Weber forcefully put it «it is, of course, not my aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic casual interpretation of culture and of history. Each is equally possible, but each, if it does not serve as the *preparation*, but as a conclusion of an investigation, accomplishes equally little in the interest of historical truth» [18, p. 183].

According to Weber, sociology «is a *science of reality*. We want to understand the reality of life as it surrounds us, and into which we are placed, in its individuality: the interrelation and the cultural *meaning* of its individual phenomena in their contemporary framework and the historical reasons for their becoming so-and-not-otherwise» [19, p. 72]. However, life confronts an observer with an endless variety of phenomena that cannot be limited even if we consider them as separate objects. Therefore, every attempt of human spirit to grasp reality originates from the appreciation of a fact that only a part of reality can be a subject matter of investigation, the part of life we consider 'essential', 'worth being known'. Human pursuit of knowledge is always, according to Weber, determined by culture understood as a final fragment of meaningless reality which, in human mind, has a meaning. Weber realistically claimed that «in this, obviously, are contained all our problems. For this presupposition cannot be proved by scientific means. It can only be *interpreted* with reference to its ultimate meaning, which we must reject or accept according to our ultimate position toward life» [20, p. 143]. In other words, social and cultural science, dealing with political and social phenomena in terms of their origin «give us no answer to the question, whether the existence of these cultural phenomena have been and are *worth while*. And they do not answer the further question, whether it is worth the effort required to know them» [20, p. 145]. Fundamentals that motivate research activity are beyond rational calculation and valida-

tion, for «‘scientific’ pleading is meaningless in principle because value spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each other. ...It is commonplace to observe that something may be true, although it is not beautiful and not holy and not good. Indeed it may be true in precisely those aspects. But all these are only the most elementary cases of the struggle that the gods of the various orders and values are engaged in. I do not know how one might wish to decide ‘scientifically’ the value of French and German culture; for here, too, different gods struggle with one another, now and for all times to come» [20, p. 148].

Social scientist is seeking to «formulate type concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical process. This distinguishes it from history, which is oriented to the casual analysis of individual actions, structures, and personalities possessing cultural significance. ...An important consideration in the formulation of sociological concepts and generalizations is the contribution that sociology can make toward the causal explanation of some historically and culturally important phenomena. As in the case of every generalizing science the abstract character of the concepts of sociology is responsible for the fact that, compared with actual historical reality, they are relatively lacking in fullness of concrete content. To compensate for this disadvantage, sociological analysis can offer a greater precision of concepts. This precision is obtained by striving for the highest possible degree of adequacy on the level of meaning» [21, p. 19-20]. Therefore, ideal types employed by sociologist are formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality [see: 19, p. 90]. The difference between natural and social sciences is in their usage of general concepts — in former case laws and regularities are the purpose of knowledge and in latter one they are means of scientific inquiry. Thus, cultural sciences are concerned with qualitative peculiarity of meaningful events of social reality.

Developmental singularity of the occidental society: the rise of the rational capitalism

In accordance with his vision of the role of values and interests theoretical pursuit, Weber defined the major specific trait of European cul-

ture as rationalization: «The great historic process in the development of religions, the elimination of magic from the world which had begun with the old Hebrew prophets and, in conjunction with Hellenistic scientific thought, had repudiated all magical means to salvation as superstition and sin, came here to its logical conclusion. The genuine Puritan even rejected all signs of religious ceremony at the grave and buried his nearest and dearest without song or ritual in order that no superstition, no trust in the effects of magical and sacramental forces on salvation, should creep in» [18, p. 105]. Intellectualization and rationalization should not be confused with the «increased and general knowledge of conditions under which one lives. It means... the knowledge or *belief* that if one but wished one *could* learn it at any time. Hence it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all thing by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One needs no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service» [20, p. 139]. At the same time rationalization is not a general law of social evolution — it is an ambiguous notion itself and this ambivalence and multiplicity of meanings is built into the process of its manifestation as well as forms which are assumed by rationality under different circumstances.

The most impressive application of the background assumptions of Weber's research program was his comparative-historical studies of economic ethics of world religions and its implications for the worldly life. The study of religion aimed at explaining the practical motives and incentives offered by psychological and pragmatic contents of world religions. Religion understood by Weber as a complex of ideas about salvation was presented as a cornerstone of a world view. Weber asserted that «not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet, very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest» [20, p. 280]. The image of the world or world view is a mediator between ideas and interests. This dialectics of ideas and interests can be interpreted through the application of the notion-metaphor of elective affinity [see: 22]. Every concept of salvation makes a distinction between meaningless and meaningful segments of the universe and every religious message is initially addressed to masses of those who are in need of salvation. Religion satisfies «the need for ethical interpretation of the 'meaning' of the distribu-

tion of fortunes among the men...» [20, p. 275]. Religion is also a set of ideas explaining how to reconcile the promise of theodicy with everyday suffering and dying. As Weber rightly observed, even at the beginning of 20-th century members of the working class asserted atheist world view not because of the convincing argument of natural sciences but because of inequality found in a social world and power relations.

In analyzing economic ethics of world religions, Weber was focusing upon Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam; he also included Judaism given its importance for the understanding Christianity and Islam as well as its role in the development of modern Western economic ethos¹. As Weber himself wrote, «the term 'economic ethics' points to the practical impulses for action which are founded in the psychological and pragmatic content of religion» [20, p. 267]. Weber never held that economic ethics was determined solely by religion and that it was a single decisive factor shaping the unique character of economic organization and economic behavior. Since the religion defines the ways of salvation, its practical ethics affects economic conduct defining the dominate type of the attitude to the world or, in other words, relationship between religious ethics and the world.

Weber was interested not in theoretical but practical influence of religion, therefore, he limited his task to examination of behavioral elements of those social strata, which determined specific characters of practical ethics of every religion (which, in turn, determined economic ethics). Weber constructed the following typology. Confucianism was a world view of well-educated, secular-rational class of officials. Hinduism was a religion of the Brahmins, a hereditary caste of well-educated in «Vedas» people. Buddhism was preached by ascetic monks isolated from the concerns of everyday life. Thus, Confucianism's solution of the tension between religious ethics and the world was an accommodation

¹

I skip Weber's discussion of Islam since it was criticized by contemporary scholars for incorrect conceptualization of the social underpinnings and bearers of this religious world view [see: 9]. Moreover, Weber's ideas on the peculiarity of the Western type of social development and the role of religious world view in general and Protestantism in particular in emergence of specific social forms has often been challenged in contemporary scholarship on various grounds. I should like to mention in passing that this criticism often — though not always — suffers from the following shortcomings: (1) it is based on misreading of Weber's argument, i.e., presents him as an idealist 'Marx' who superseded mode of production by religion; (2) ideologically laden by the sharp juxtaposition of alleged Weber's 'Occidentalism' and 'Orientalism' as its opposite side; and (3) confuses refutation of empirical statement with refutation of the theory. [For more detailed discussion presenting different perspectives on this issue see: 23; 24].

to the demands of everyday life in a society. The consequence of such an attitude was the lack of universal ethics which could embrace the society as a whole. At the same time Confucianism left a room for means-end rational action. Hinduism was an example of a reconciliation with the world — an outcome of this posture was the creation of particularistic moral orders for every social strata. Buddhism solution was an escape from the world; this led to the emergence of two separate ethics of religious monks-virtuosi and laymen.

Christianity developed as a religion of artisans, generally urban and bourgeois strata. It was a unique breakthrough in cultural history which created preconditions for mutual penetration of religious ethics and the world [see: 25, p. 730-731].

According to Weber, every religion is determined by a certain type of rationalism — either theoretical or practical. The former is an inherent trait of intellectuals, while the latter is a feature of classes like artisans and merchants. Destruction of syncretic concretely-magic world image led, on the one hand, to the rise of rationality and control over nature, that is, to formation of the idea of a 'space' controlled by impersonal laws, and, on the other hand, it generated 'mystic' experience with inherent to it other-world orientation that could ensure individual salvation and blessing.

Religious systems influenced by intellectuals (like Hinduism and Buddhism) were directed to contemplation and nirvana and thus could not preach the idea of mastery over world.

Completely different direction of evolution is witnessed in case when religion was under impact of practically acting strata, for example, knights, political officials or classes engaged in economic production. For instance, the bourgeois, in Western European sense, strata — because of lesser dependence upon nature — displayed practical rationalism in their behavior; these strata had a chance to produce rational ethical regulation of life.

It's important to note the centrality of Weber's sociology of asceticism and its profound effect on the conceiving of ways to salvation as well as its implications for orientation of a social action. As Weber put it, «salvation may be viewed as the distinctive gift of active ethical behavior performed in the awareness that god directs this behavior, i.e., that the actor is instrument of god. We shall designate this type of attitude toward salvation, which is characterized by methodical procedure for achieving religious salvation, as 'ascetic'» [26, p. 164]. Religious virtuoso does not only subject his wants to systematic conduct but also exercises the control of his relations and interactions with everyday life of community

which he considers inevitably unheroic and utilitarian. Religious virtuoso views the world of social relations as a realm of temptation, for it is a «site of sensual pleasures which are ethically irrational and completely diverting from things divine, but even more because it fosters in the religiously average person complement self-sufficiency and self-righteousness in the fulfillment of common obligations, at the expense of the uniquely necessary concentration on active achievement leading to salvation» [26, p. 165].

Asceticism, elaborates further Weber, may assume two forms — world rejecting asceticism and inner-worldly asceticism. If the former preachers the withdrawal from the world, the latter requires that individual participate in the world for the sake of salvation as the elect instrument of god. In this case «the world as a creation of god, whose power comes to expression in it..., provides the only medium through which one's unique religious charisma may prove itself by means of rational ethical conduct, so that one may become and remain certain about one's own state of grace» [26, p. 167]. Worldly ascetic way of life is intrinsically rationalist in a sense of patterning one's personal conduct and rejection of ethically irrational behavior.

The typology of economic ethics, elaborated by Weber, helps increase our understanding of their elective affinity with certain types of economic action and economic rationalism. Weber was seeking to conceptualize the emergence of a radically new social, political and economic order which developed in the West in 16-17 centuries as an element of bourgeois rationalization of life — 'revolution of saints', as Michael Walzer [see: 27] dubbed the phenomenon — eventually leading to rational capitalism. It is worth noting that Weber made a clear distinction between robber capitalism whose structure and spirit «differs radically from the rational management of an ordinary capitalist large-scale enterprise and is most similar to some old age phenomena: the huge rapacious enterprises in the financial and colonial sphere and occasional trade... The double nature of what may be called the 'capitalist spirit', and the specific character of modern routinized capitalism with its professional bureaucracy, can be understood only if these two structural elements, which are ultimately different but everywhere intertwined, are conceptually distinguished» [21, p. 1118]. To sum up, adventurous capitalism which develops under the framework of patrimonial system «gives free rein to the enrichment of the ruler himself, the court officials, favorites, governors, mandarins, the tax collectors, influence peddlers, and the great merchants and financiers who function as tax-farmers, purveyors and creditors. The ruler's favor and disfavor, grants and confisca-

tions, continuously create new wealth and destroy it again» [21, p. 1099]. It is worth noting that according to Weber, rational capitalism was a distinctive outcome of the developmental history of the West and was characterized by rational organization of formally free labor — alienated from the means of production — and industrial production of a factory type¹.

Weber's comparative-historical studies in sociology of religion provided a brilliant insight into the factors which unleashed human mastery over world and gradually superseded adventurers of capitalist development by order patterned by churchmen, inner-worldly ascetics who turned their respective societies into, as John Keats put it, «colonies of savers and successful entrepreneurs» [quoted in: 30, p. 1176].

Another generic feature of Protestant world view was its stress upon ethics of professional vocation in the world which differed dramatically from asceticism of dervish, for example, for the latter had very little relationship to secular world and occupations. In Weber's own words «only in Protestant ethic of vocation does the world... possess unique and religious significance as the object through which one fulfills his duties by rational behavior according to the will of an absolutely transcendental god. When success crowns rational, sober, purposive behavior of the

¹

Contemporary scholarship influenced by the debate over 'Orientalism' thesis and considerations of political correctness is tackling the issue of rational capitalist economy and modernity in general in more careful and balanced manner, arguing that there are multiple modernities, which differ from Western, Protestant modernity. The former attained hegemony in this epoch and was conceptualized so brilliantly and powerfully by Weber. The idea that modernization equals Westernization is receiving now rather skeptical treatment. Western modernity called by British sociologist Nicos Mouzelis Protestant one — I myself think that European version of modern society can be termed as Weberian modernity, for this thinker's treatment of the phenomenon in question shaped not only our perception of social, political, economic, and cultural orders associated with it, but influenced the workings of the system of modern societies themselves — is considered as one of possible modes of social development which does not preclude alternative paths to modern society. Therefore, it is more productive to speak of 'original' Weberian modernity which «developed in Europe and combined several closely connected dimensions. In structural terms, these included differentiation, urbanization, industrialization, and communication...; in institutional terms, they included the nation-state and the rational capitalist economy; in cultural terms, they allowed for the construction of new collective identities bound up with the nation-state but embedded in a cultural program that entailed different modes of structuring the major arenas of social life» [28, p. 3]. In more general terms of Parsonian sociological tradition — enriched by synthesis with Marxist oriented historical sociology — non-Western modernity can be conceived of as «a type of social organization which, from a social-integration point of view, is characterized by an unprecedented level of social mobilization/incorporation into the centre; and, from the point of view of system integration, by an equally unprecedented level of institutional differentiation» [29, p. 156].

sort not oriented exclusively to worldly acquisition, such success is construed as a sign that god's blessing rests upon such behavior. ... This religion demanded of the believer ... not poverty (as it was in case of Catholic monks. — P.K.), but the elimination of all idle and exploitative enjoyment of unearned wealth and income, and the avoidance of all feudalistic, sensuous ostentation of wealth; not the ascetic death-in-life of the cloister, but an alert, rationally controlled patterning of life, and the avoidance of all surrender to the beauty of the world, to art, to one's own moods and emotions. ... Its typical representative was the 'man of a vocation', and its unique result was the rational organization and institutionalization of social relationships» [26, p. 182-183].

As the paradigm manifestation of the 'capitalist spirit' Weber presents Benjamin Franklin's moral maxim — «Remember, time is money». This maxim translated Solomon's proverb — «Do you see a man skillful in his work? He will stand before kings...» (Prov. 22:29) — into the language of people who were adhered to their professional vocation and followed their missions in the world, systematically and rationally seeking to maximize economic profit.

This world view was opposite to the spirit of traditional economy, the chief purpose of which was satisfaction of human wants and preservation of traditional mode of life in the whole. Marx came up with a structuralist explanation of withering away of traditionalism, stressing the role of objective external circumstances, i.e., productive forces and relations of production, while Weber primarily was concerned with the emergence of a new type of personality which, firstly, without changing production system, introduced a new ethos — spirit of modern capitalism. It was confronted with a vigorous resistance of traditionalism, and, therefore, along with extraordinary strong will and reckless activism, businessmen of new type had to master specific ethic qualities that could provide them with necessary trust of clients and workers. Moreover, growth of intensity and productivity of labor, incompatible with hedonistic attitude to life, required ethic legitimacy which could only be an irrational feeling of well done duty in accordance with one's mission. Every ascetic Protestantism believer through rational control over his own life helped to transform a mundane everyday life into rational activity in the world, but not of this world and not for this world.

Neither passivity nor enjoyment but only activity in the world was viewed as increasing glory of God. Ascetic Protestantism regarded contemplation as less welcome to God than active execution of God will within framework of one's profession. Apostle Paul in one of his epistles demanded that «if any one will not work, let him not eat» (2 Thess. 3:10) and

this became obligatory requirement addressed to everyone without exception, making an unwillingness to work an indication of lack of grace. Inner-worldly asceticism of Protestantism denied enjoyment from mere fact of accumulation of the wealth¹. According to German sociologist Richard Munch, «this penetration of ethics into the domain of business is for Weber the specific mark of modern capitalism, in comparison with all non-Western and premodern forms of economic behavior» [25, p. 731].

Though Karl Marx's vision of history and background assumptions of his research program were different from those of Weber — Marx was often confusing his study of society the development of which he conceived of as a 'process of natural history' with politically and ideologically laden judgments — he also addressed phenomenon of asceticism, but in a peculiar manner typical for his discourse. Marx explained the phenomenon of asceticism as an outcome of the development of capitalist mode of production and not as one of its key preconditions: «political economy, this science of *wealth*, is therefore simultaneously the science of denial, of want, of *thrift*, of *saving*... This science of marvelous industry is simultaneously the science of *asceticism*, its true ideal is the *ascetic* but *extortionate* miser and the *ascetic* but *productive* slave. Thus political economy — despite its worldly and wanton appearance — is a true moral science, the most moral of all sciences. Self-denial, the denial of life and of all human needs, is its cardinal doctrines. The less you eat, drink and read books; the less you go to the theater, the dance hall, the public house; the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you *save* and the greater becomes your treasure which neither moths nor dust will devour — your *capital*» [32, p. 95–96].

¹ Ernst Troeltsch thus commented Weber's approach to asceticism: «Weber explained the transformation of the term in its particular Calvinist manner from rigorous other-worldly way of thinking into an economic-capitalist activity in religious and psychological terms» [quoted in: 23, p. 31]. Weber himself described the role of Protestant sects in developing ascetic way of life and activist attitude to the world in a letter to Adolf von Harnack in following terms: «Luther towers above all others, but Lutheranism is — I don't deny it — in its historical articulation the most frightening of terrors for me. Even in the ideal form in which it appears in your hope for the future, it lacks, I fear, in its impact on us Germans, sufficient transforamtive power to shape life. It is a difficult and tragic situation: None of us could be a sectarian, a Quarker, a Baptist, etc. Everybody must recognize the superiority of the institutional church in non-ethical and non-religious [i.e., cultural] respects. The time of the sects, or of something equivalent to them, is definitely over. But the fact that our nation never went through the school of hard asceticism, in no form whatsoever, is the source of everything that I hate about it (and about myself). I can't help it, but in religious terms the average American sect member surpasses our institutional Christians as much as Luther excels, as religious personality, Calvin, Fox, et tutti quanti» [quoted in: 23, p. 29–30].

No doubt, methodical labor was praised by literature of ascetic sects of all confessions, but only Protestant asceticism added to it psychological impetus and premium transforming it into effective norm of everyday life. This impulse developed from one's attitude to work as one's mission in a world and confirmation of predestination to salvation. Ascetic Protestantism was an integral part of modern Western European '*homo economicus*' type of personality which destroyed traditional 'organic' order of absolutism by creating new units for individual membership — 'democratically' organized autonomies religious sects — in contrast to corporate social organization of Middle Ages.

In Weber's view, the main trend of Western cultural evolution was transfer of asceticism from monastic cell to professional life and its dominance over world¹. He himself was quite pessimistic about future of capitalist ascetic civilization: «Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work out its ideals in the world, material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. Today the spirit of religious asceticism — whether finally, who knows? — has escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, also seems to be irretrievably fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs» [18, p. 181–182]. Furthermore, even in a country which Weber considered a paradigm example of a realization of ascetic Protestantism ideal, «the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport» [18, p. 182], thus making capitalism an impersonal and empty cosmos deprived of its initial moral impetus. It is important to remember that Weber was not a champion of capitalism, considering it only as a 'lesser evil', in comparison to total bureaucratization of life under prophetically envisaged by him, state socialism. From this perspective British sociologist's John Eldridge comment about Weber, which revokes often cited Weber's self-description as a bourgeois thinker — «bourgeois he may be, happy is not» [34, p. 89] does not seem to be an exaggeration.

¹ Interestingly that Marx arrived at exactly the same conclusion with regard to Luther who «overcame servitude through devotion but only by substituting servitude through conviction ... He transformed the priests into laymen by turning *laymen into priests*. He liberated man from external religiosity by making religiosity the innermost essence of man» [33, p. 60].

Weberian perspective on social development and realities of post-Leninist Ukraine

Experience of some East Asian countries rush-to or catch up modernization provides evidence supportive to both Weberian and structuralist state-centered approaches — despite the critical role of the state as a main economic agent and instigator of change — the success of Asian Tigers' economic development was possible, because the policies were compatible with mode of action sanctioned by traditional political and economic culture. In addition, Tigers' modernization was input driven by expansion of employment, increases in education levels, and massive investment in physical capital. For example, Korean growth was sustained by government which «invested about US \$10 billion from 1973 to 1979, an enormous amount of capital at that time» [36, p. 14] into national economy. More recently IMF bailed out Korea with «its largest loan ever (about \$21 billion)» [37]. Ukraine itself does not have an amount of financial resources needed to boost its economy, and international financial organizations are highly unlikely to provide Ukraine with funds equal to Korean and Brazilian bail outs.

Neotraditionalist Ukrainian state of patrimonial bent is vested with a task of setting up the pillars for the Western type rational capitalism but as it was observed by Weber «the mercantilistic regulations of the State might develop industries, but not, or certainly not alone, the *spirit of capitalism* (italics added); where they assumed a despotic authoritarian character, they to a larger extent directly hindered it...» [18, p. 152]¹. In addition, accelerated development instigated from above always cherishes corruption as its indispensable side effect.

Therefore, we again confront problems first raised by Weber in 'ever green', as John Eldridge called it, «Protestant Ethic», namely the question of interrelation between generalized system of values and economic activity. In a light of above remarks on the role of capitalist spirit and forms of economic organization adequate to such a world view it might be helpful to review the impact of mentality or habitus in Bourdieu's

¹

Eminent student of French absolutism has provided us with a following picture of relations between state and economic society in 18-th century France: «factors such as economic estrangement, political loyalty and striving for eminence and ennoblement through administrative and tax apparatus were determining French bourgeoisie attitude towards monarchy» [38, p. 22]. If we omit 'ennoblement', this passage might serve as an ideal-typical description of Ukrainian class of 'political capitalists' generated by patrimonial state policies.

terms which developed in domestic socio-cultural context upon specific features of this country socio-cultural evolution. We cannot ignore the fact that despite the singularity of socio-cultural and political development of Ukraine it was a part of Russian and then Soviet world-empires for 350 years and this had profound effect upon structural and cultural dimensions of Ukrainian society.

More than 150 years ago, advancing the idea that nations like individuals have moral characters, Russian philosopher and thinker Piotr Tchaadaev emphasized the dynamic influence of Christianity on the social development of the West: «Only Christian society is actually inspired by spiritual interests, these new nations are capable of perfecting themselves, this is the secret of their culture... Of course, this interest will never be satisfied; it is unlimited by its nature. Thus, the Christian peoples perpetually move forward with a necessity. At the same time, although the aim that they try to achieve has nothing to do with welfare for which non-Christian peoples are striving, they also find this welfare and use it» [39, p. 118]. Tchaadaev went on arguing that Western Christianity formed a base of European and, even more, Western civilization with its ideas of duty, justice, right, and order, while Russia adopted moral ideas from Byzantine coupled with its religious isolation. In Tchaadaev's mind that was the reason of weakness of societal forces at the beginning of Russian history. Russian empire was an exemption from the general law of the mankind — it gave nothing to the world and taught the world nothing, its peoples did not offer any great truth, thus, the history of empire could only serve as a negative example.

Developing his argument further, Tchaadaev claimed that slavery of Russian peasants (as well as Ukrainian peasants of that time) was an outcome of logical development of things deriving from people's inner life, their religious views, overall nature [see: 39, p. 368]. «We should not forget, — wrote Tchaadaev, — that in comparison with Russia, everything in Europe is permeated with the spirit of liberty: monarchs, governments, and peoples. How can we expect that this Europe will sympathize for Russia? In this case we are having a natural struggle between light and darkness!» [39, p. 368].

Slavophiles did not share Tchaadaev's ambivalent style of thinking: they came up with rather mythological frame of reference based on the sharp dichotomy of Rus (East) and Europe (West). By presenting its elements as mutually exclusive values, they defined 'right' and 'wrong' types of social system. I deliberately simplify rather complex picture of

the Slavophiles ideas, focusing upon the ideal features of cultural tradition that prevented the realization of Western model of societal order.

Slavophiles had no doubts about the correctness of their utopian image of Rus (East) contrasted to the West where law was a formal compulsion without inner justice, while in Rus (East), law was an inner truth and genuine right; selfishness of utilitarian owner was restricted by the communal fraternity without private property. Finally, «all-destroying personality logically developed by Protestantism» (A.S.Khomiakov), leading to isolation of an individual was juxtaposed with the communal system that limited ambitions of private persons and supported communal-orthodox spirit in the society [see: 41]. Slavophiles could, therefore, have little sympathy to the cornerstone of a Western market economy — *homo economicus* — for which «the dynamics of supply and demand or its generalized expression in ethical, theological and philosophical doctrines, presenting the world as a field of pursuit of private interests is a universal and ultimate imperative of everyday behavior, regardless whether we are talking of economy, politics or spiritual life» [42, p. 8]. For Slavophiles the impersonal force of market was something unnatural and opposed to traditional mode of discourse which placed constraints on a action guided by means-end rationality, it even can be said «that a member of a traditional society, no matter what private goals he pursues, is always concerned with maintaining of general sacral order» [42, p. 8]. Such an attitude had a solid, practically relevant rational behind it «because every proposed alternative creates more problems than it solves, socially and economically speaking» [43, p. 37].

Slavophiles' comprehensive description of culture was an objective picture of the society that had very few incentives for putting up with 'vanity fair' associated with market. Paradoxically, such a posture was unable to constrain selfish strive for profit unlimited by value-rationality and norms. The recipes suggested by Slavophiles can be reduced to a single measure — they were in favor of immediate break up with the West and its venomous cultural influence. K.S.Aksakov, one of the most straightforward and consistent defenders of Slavophile ideas, held that the West was in process of destruction which revealed its inner falsehood. Western public helped to sever Russian educated society from people (*narodnost'*) [see: 44, p. 105]. A.S.Khomiakov also saw the ultimate cause of all problems of Russian social life in a division between educated classes and the people (*narod*), division that was generated by moral revolution in the minds of noble estate which underwent transformation from the servant of the country to its master. From Khomiakov's

perspective, this profound change occurred because Russian noble service estate (*sluzhivoe soslovie*)¹ «under the influence of foreign enlightenment lost its character of people capable of living and thinking independently and turned into imitators of everything foreign» [46, p. 109].

Religious messianism inserted into political life, legitimated the centralization of power and derived its strength from the centralization; these two factors severely hampered all attempts of private initiative, bringing the development of capitalist spirit to standstill. Its opposite side was political radicalism viewing the secular power not as relatively neutral tool — an outcome of a European bifurcation of political and religious authority that emerged in Middle Ages² — but as an embodiment of the Kingdom of Darkness. No wonder that ‘Old Believers’ — religious movement whose religious and economic life was in certain respects quite similar to that of Protestant sects viewed political authority in terms of apostle John’s prince of this world who rules in a darkness (John. 16:11) or Antichrist. (It should not be ignored that ‘Old Believers’ were preaching the strict adherence to the norms of a traditional way of life and their economic achievements can be attributed to isolation from the mainstream society and necessity to have sufficient resources to resist to permanent pressure of the state³).

At the beginning of 20-th century the authors of «Vekhi» [see: 49] captured the gap between a ruling political class, cultural elite, and the masses. This situation, in a conceptual language of functionalist sociological theory, can be perceived as an estrangement of central cultural system from central institutional system (E.Shills). This led to the formation of incompatible value systems inherent to every social stratum.

¹

Detailed examination of terms usually employed by the historians of Middle Ages goes beyond the scope of this essay. I should like to note in passing that as it was observed by Russian historian Pavlov-Silvansky the term ‘servant’ of medieval period had nothing in common with a house servant nowadays. The term «meant a prince (*kniiaz*) and important noble (*boyarin*) who had a duty of honorable military service to his ruler, in other words, it meant a vassal» [45, p. 103].

²

Hobbes ironically rebuffed the supporters of subjection of the civil power to the spiritual one by saying that «one Power may be subordinated to another, as the art of a Saddler, to the art of a Rider» [47, p. 601].

³

Brilliant examination of the dynamics of ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ in cultural and political systems on the terrain of Russian empire can be found in Lotman and Uspensky [48]. Authors have shown that recapitulation of ‘Western’ forms rarely led to their internalization at a personal level. Moreover, the interpretation of the meaning of these ‘innovations’ was often quite different from ‘enlightened’ despot’s original intentions.

It was also one of the major reasons of the failure of modernization attempts from above which ended up as mere formal recapitulation of Western institutions. Intellectual elite (intelligentsia) was alienated both from masses and ruling establishment and, therefore, was inclined to construct utopian projects, directed at destroying foundations of existing social order. In a line of reasoning resembling that of Tchaadaev, one of the authors of «Vekhi» S.Bulgakov¹ insisted that Western European culture was rooted in religion in general and Reformation in particular. Protestantism affected even Catholic realms which had to undergo religious revival to survive the competition of a new religious world view. Bulgakov who was familiar with Weber's «Protestant Ethic» thesis shared his background assumptions and conclusions concerning the role of a «new personality of a European man ... born in Reformation» [49, p. 40]. Moreover, he held that political freedom, freedom of religion and human rights experienced profound impact of Protestantism, especially in its ascetic forms. In 1922, five years after Bolshevik revolution, Bulgakov who had been ordained an Orthodox priest by that time, voiced his concerns over a dominant pattern of religious and more generally cultural development of Kyiv Rus and then Russian empire in a piece written in a form of dialog titled «By the Walls of Khersones». One of the participants of the dialog points out that adoption of Christianity from Greeks brought along Byzantine closeness and narrow-mindedness; it separated the country as a Great Wall of Chine from Western Christian Europe reducing the faith to mere formalism and empty ritual while enforcing dangerous imperial conceit: «In a single article of any Protestant confession there was more dogmatic depth and commitment to the church than in those endless controversies over rite and faith. It is there were fatal Byzantine closeness and conceit — the belief that we became the Third Rome» [50, 115].

Defenders of Ukrainian singularity and its natural link to Europe which is claimed to have been only temporally interrupted by foreign oppressors often employ pseudo-historical arguments to buttress their claims. In a light of such an approach [see: 51, p. 32-33] Ukraine's return to Europe is interpreted as the restoration of intrinsically European tradition and rejection of superficially imposed by Russia and Soviet Un-

¹

It is worth noting intellectual evolution of Bulgakov who began his career as an orthodox adherent of Marxism — a typical start for Russian intellectual of the turn of the centuries, then found strength and courage to embrace idealism (the title of his book «From Marxism to Idealism» beautifully captures the inner tension and dynamics of his search for truth) and ended up as an Orthodox priest.

ion rulers 'Eurasian' patterns of culture and societal organization. Interestingly enough, that Mykhailo Hrushevsky, a framer of an independent Ukraine and a historian known for sober and shrewd judgment summed up the legacy of Cossacks in general and Bohdan Khmelnytsky in particular — paradigm figure of Ukrainian state founding father of European bent for every contemporary myth makers — for development of Ukrainian state in the following terms: «I fully acknowledge that Khmelnytsky was a great man but his greatness did not lie in a domain of political and state building of new Europe. There is too much from Asia in him, from great Asian nomad invaders, founders of state-hordes... The elementary state economy, the hand of 'state master of Ukrainian terrain' are totally unnoticed in him» [52, p. 1496].

Conclusion

Unfortunately, little seems to have changed over decades. Political radicalism of Netchaev, Tkachev and Lenin bent has been replaced by market bolshevism whose belief in a possibility of modern liberal-democratic capitalism on post-Soviet terrain «is simply a dream, a fantasy displayed on television in second-rate American films. It has, of course, a special magic in a shortage economy. But it is no less utopian than the idea of socialism in the United States» [5, p. 36-37].

Under current circumstances, institutions of market, substantive political democracy, and civil society can be embedded in Ukraine only in case of the emergence of values — dominant over socio-cultural system — capable of providing normative control over selfish strives for self-interest of market actors. Without such interpenetration of ethics and sphere of market the 'free play of means-end rationality' (R.Munch) will inevitably lead to chaos in society and the destruction of the social order.

Perhaps one of the most insightful students of Leninist societies Ken Jowitt discovered the existence of capitalism in the Soviet Union in 70-ies. He emphasized the 'political' nature of that arrangement which critically distinguished it from the rational capitalism [12]. Subsequent development of the Soviet Union vividly demonstrated that capitalism and market — especially if the profit and rent seeking activities tend to occur under the aegis of state patrimonial protection — can not offer universal solutions to the problems arising in a course of social development. It is plausible to think that 'radical market reform' alone — even if

really attempted — is unlikely to lead automatically to the emergence of a new type of personality and values.

Russian sociologist Yury Davydov has suggested that it does not make sense to lament about the absence of rational everyday work ethics and to rhetorically call for its creation, since dilemmas of post-Leninist societies as a whole — between the desire inspired by universal liberal capitalism to design market democracy, and the particular constellation of factors jeopardizing the integrity of social order and threatening to turn current decay into the stable pattern of systemic degeneration — is too far complex to solve in a single essay. My concern has rather been how to deal with the consequences of the ‘post-revolutionary hangover’ (as L.Kolakowsky dubbed the situation) which came after a short-term euphoria generated by the fall of Leninist regimes. This ‘hangover’ with its painful and unpleasant side-effects can last for a long time. Lord Dahrendorf, using an apocalyptic symbolism of number six, claimed that the countries of Eastern and Central Europe may need six months to implement the constitutional reform, six years for society to benefit from the economic reform, and even sixty years might not be enough to lay down the foundation of vibrant civil society and make the changes irreversible [quoted in: 54, p. 227]. When Dahrendorf’s prediction came out, he was accused of being too pessimistic. If we bear in mind that Ukraine spent five years framing and adopting its new constitution — almost ten times as long as Dahrendorf expected — we may conclude that he was overtly optimistic and, therefore, experts on post-Leninism and ‘transition’ need not worry about finding jobs in decades to come¹.

¹

I deliberately limited my discussion in this essay to the review of problems arising in a course of interaction between economic system and socio-cultural system, while ignoring the impact of the logic of political sphere and its transformation upon two former subsystems. More detailed analysis of the role of the state in societal transformation can be found in [55]. I should like to note in passing that economic modernization from above can be achieved by means of ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ vigorously pushing through the radical program of reform. But it should be born in mind that the social costs of such a mode of development are enormous and every single successful modernizing dictator can be matched with dozens of failed attempts. In addition, the patrimonial political constellation that has evolved in Ukraine is not extremely conducive for the rise of the degree of rationalism of social organization in Ukraine. To sum up, the reality again defies naive belief of transitologists who still take promises of Ukrainian political establishment at face value (the extreme version of such a ‘naivety’ which reveals author’s complete misunderstanding of the subject matter in question can be found in Paul Kubicek writings. [See for example: 56].

References

1. *Sombart W.* Why Is There No Socialism in The United States? — London, 1976.
2. *Fukuyama F.* Second Thoughts // *The National Interest*. — 1999. — № 56.
3. *Palenka Y.* Shadow Economy and Taxation. — Paper presented at the conference on Economic Theory of Market Distortions and the Shadow Economy. — Kyiv, 1997.
4. *Gaddy C., Ickes B.* Beyond Bailout: Time to Face Reality About Russia's «Virtual Economy», 1998. <<http://www.brook.edu>>.
5. *Burawoj M., Krotov P.* The Soviet Transition From Socialism to Capitalism // *American Sociological Review* — 1992. — Vol. 57. — № 1.
6. *Marx K.* Capital. — New York, 1967. — Vol. 3.
7. *Kopstein J.* From East Germany to Germany: Between Moral Economy and Political Economy. — UC Berkeley Center for European and German Studies Working Paper. — Berkeley, 1997.
8. *Jowitt K.* Really Imaginary Socialism // *East European Constitutional Review*. — 1997. — Vol. 6. — № 1.
9. *Turner B.* Max Weber on Individualism, Bureaucracy and Despotism // *Organizing Modernity*. — London; New York, 1994.
10. *Castoriadis C.* Political and Social Writings. — Minneapolis, 1988. — Vol. 1.
11. *Tismaneanu V.* Endangered Species? // *Partisan Review*. — 1996. — Vol. 62. — № 2.
12. *Jowitt K.* New World Disorder. — Berkeley, 1993.
13. *Stark D.* From System Identity to Organizational Diversity // *Sisyphus*. — 1992. — Vol. 1.
14. *Mamardashvili M. K.* Mysl' Pod Zapretom (The Thought under Prohibition) // *Voprosy Filosofii* (Questions of Philosophy). — 1992. — № 5.
15. *Wolferen K. van.* The Enigma of Japanese Power. — New York, 1990.
16. *Alexander J.C.* Action and its Environments: Toward a New Synthesis. — New York, 1988.
17. *Alexander J.C.* The New Theoretical Movement // *Handbook of Sociology* / Ed. by N.J. Smelser. — Los Angeles; London, 1988.
18. *Weber M.* The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. — New York, 1958.
19. *Weber M.* The Methodology of the Social Sciences. — New York, 1949.
20. *Weber M.* From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. — New York, 1958.
21. *Weber M.* Economy and Society. — Berkeley, 1978.
22. *Kutuev P.* The Concept of Elective Affinity in Max Weber's Sociology // *Sociology: theory, methods, marketing*. — 1999. — № 3, pp. 136-149.
23. Weber's «Protestant Ethic»: Origin, Evidence, Context / Ed. by H. Lehmann and G. Roth. — Cambridge, 1993
24. *Kulke H.* Kings and Cults. — New Delhi, 1993
25. *Munch R.* Talcott Parsons and the Theory of Action. Part 1 // *American Journal of Sociology*. — 1981. — Vol. 86. — № 4.

26. Weber M. *Sociology of Religion*. — Boston, 1963.
27. Walzer M. *The Revolution of the Saints*. — Cambridge, 1965.
28. Eisenstadt S.N., Schluchter W. *Paths to Early Modernity: A Comparative View* // *Deadalus*. — 1998. — Vol. 127. — № 3.
29. Mouzelis N. *Modernity: A Non-European Conceptualization* // *British Journal of Sociology*. — 1999. — Vol. 50. — № 1.
30. Weber M. *Anticritical Last Word on «The Spirit of Capitalism»* // *American Journal of Sociology*. — 1978. — Vol. 83. — № 5.
31. Marx K. *Capital*. — New York, 1977. — Vol. 1.
32. Marx K. *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* // *The Marx-Engels Reader* / Ed. By R.Tucker. — New York; London, 1978.
33. Marx K. *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's «Philosophy of Right»*: Introduction // *The Marx-Engels Reader* / Ed. by R.Tucker. — New York; London, 1978.
34. Eldridge J. *Work and Authority: Some Weberian Perspectives* // *Organizing Modernity*. — London; New York, 1994.
35. Sayer D. *A Notable Administration: English State Formation and the Rise of Capitalism* // *American Journal of Sociology*. — 1992. — Vol. 97. — № 5.
36. Han Sang-Jin. *The Korean Path to Modernization and Risk Society* // *Korean Journal*. — 1998. — Vol. 38. — № 1.
37. Neiss H. *Public Sacrifice Serves as Driving Force for Recovery* // *Korea Times*. — 1998. — November, 30.
38. Malov V.N. J.B.Colbert. *Absolutistskaja Burokratija i Francuzskoje Obshchestvo* (J.B.Colbert. *Absolutist Bureaucracy and French Society*). — Moscow, 1991.
39. Tchaadaev P.Y. *Stat'i i Pisma* (Papers and Letters). — Moscow, 1989.
40. Pushkin A.S. *Puteshestviye iz Moskvyy v Peterburg* (The Trip from Moscow to Petersburg) // *Polnoje Sobranije Sochinenij* (Completed Works). — Moscow, 1950. — Vol. 5.
41. Peskov A.M. *Germanskij Kompleks Slavianofilov* (The German Complex of Slavophiles) // *Voprosy Filosofii* (Questions of Philosophy). — 1992. — № 2.
42. Ignatiev A.A. *Tsennosti Nauki i Traditsionnoje Obshchestvo* (Values of Science and Traditional Society) // *Voprosy Filosofii* (Questions of Philosophy). — 1991. — № 4.
43. Bendix R. *Work and Authority in Industry*. — Berkeley, 1974.
44. Koshelev V.A. *Predisloviye k Publikatsii* (Introduction to Publication) // *Voprosy Filosofii* (Questions of Philosophy). — 1991. — № 3.
45. Pavlov-Silvansky N.P. *Feodalizm v Rossii* (Feudalism in Russia). — Moscow, 1988.
46. Khomiakov A.S. *Politicheskije Pisma 1848 goda* (Political Letters of 1848) // *Voprosy Filosofii* (Questions of Philosophy). — 1991. — № 3.
47. Hobbes T. *Leviathan*. — London, 1985.
48. Lotman Y., Uspensky B. *Rol' Dualnykh Modelej v Dinamike Russkoj Kultury* (The Role of Dual Models in the Dynamics of Russian Culture) // *Trudy po Znakovym Sistemam* (Studies in Semiotic Systems). — Tartu, 1977. — Vol. 5

49. Vekhi. Iz Glubiny (Landmarks. From the Depth). — Moscow, 1991.
50. *Bulgakov S.* U Sten Khersonesa (By the Walls of Khersones) // *Socis* (Sociological Studies). — 1991. — № 1.
51. *Bychko A.K., Bychko I.V.* Fenomen Ukrainskoj Intelligentsii (Phenomenon of Ukrainian Intelligentsia). — Drohobych, 1997.
52. *Hrushevsky M.* Istorija Ukrajiny-Rusy (History of Ukraine-Rus). — Kyiv, 1997. — Vol. 9. — Part 2.
53. *Habermas J.* The Crisis of Legitimation. — Boston, 1975.
54. *Korbonski A.* Civil Society and Democracy in Poland: Problems and Prospects // *Civil Society, Political Society, Democracy.* — Ljubljana, 1994.
55. *Kutuev P.* Democracy, State and Development: The Case of the Post-Leninist Ukraine // *Scientific Proceedings of the University «Kyiv-Mohyla Academy»: Sociology.* — 1999. — Vol. 11.
56. *Kubicek P.* Post-Soviet Ukraine: In Search of a Constituency for Reform // *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transitional Politics.* — 1997. — Vol. 13. — № 3.